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1. Introduction
Interbank markets play a major role in the functioning 
of the ﬁ  nancial system. They provide an effective way of 
transferring liquidity from banks with a cash surplus to 
those with a cash deﬁ  cit. At the macro-economic level, 
interbank markets strengthen ﬁ  nancial  integration  but 
they also increase linkages and common exposures to risks 
within the banking sector. At the micro-economic level, 
individual institutions make use of interbank markets for 
their liquidity and risk management. As a consequence, 
these markets represent one of the most important chan-
nels of contagion through which problems affecting one 
bank/country may spread to other banks / countries.
In the same spirit as analyses undertaken by other cen-
tral banks  (1), this paper addresses implications of Belgian 
interbank linkages for ﬁ  nancial stability. The main objec-
tive is to evaluate the risk that a chain reaction in the 
interbank market − i.e., a situation where the failure of 
one bank would lead to problems among one or more of 
its interbank creditors − could create wider systemic risk 
in Belgium.
The Belgian interbank market (2)  is very international 
and highly concentrated. This observation raises several 
interesting questions. How have consolidation and inter-
nationalisation affected the interbank market  ? To what 
extent could the failure of banks in another European 
country’s banking system affect Belgian banks through 
interbank exposures ? How has interbank contagion risk 
evolved over time? How does the assessment of conta-
gion risk in Belgium compare with assessments in other 
countries ?
Bank failures have historically been rare events, even 
more so in Belgium than in many other countries. Yet, 
because bank failures are not impossible, understanding 
the potential channels through which the failure of one 
bank (foreign or domestic) might affect Belgian banks is 
an important aspect of ﬁ  nancial stability. Like the studies 
for other countries, we undertake a stylised, mechanical 
exercise (3) − resembling a stress test − to examine the 
potential for interbank contagion to occur in Belgium. 
Namely, we investigate the consequences of non-repay-
ment of interbank loans of a given bank on the capital 
of its bank lenders (and any further domino-like effects 
from the latter banks), under the assumption that no 
adjustments have been made in interbank exposures to 
the failing banks. This assumption implies clear limita-
tions; for example, it rules out preventive measures that 
might be taken by regulators or individual banks, such as 
reducing exposures to the failing bank. More generally, 
the assumption excludes any behavioural changes (which 
could also include bank panics) arising from market 
expectations about failing banks.
In the analysis we distinguish between potential con-
tagion initiated by the failure of a Belgian bank versus 
potential contagion risk from abroad, i.e. implied by the 
failure of a foreign bank. We also investigate how the risk 
of contagion associated with failure of a Belgian bank has 
evolved over time. In addition, we are partially able to take 
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(1)  See, for example Wells (2002) for the UK, Upper and Worms (2002) for Germany. 
Analyses undertaken by other ﬁ  nancial institutions include Sheldon and Maurer 
(1998) for Switzerland, and Furﬁ  ne (1999) for the US.
(2)  By Belgian interbank market, we refer here to the set of interbank exposures where 
at least one of the counterparts is a bank incorporated in Belgium.
(3)  Although the studies cited in Footnote 1 differ in the ways in which they estimate 
bilateral interbank exposures, they all use mechanical contagion mechanisms.106
into account the moderation of interbank contagion risk 
arising from the increasing use of risk mitigation tech-
niques, such as collateralised interbank loans or repur-
chase agreements (repos).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
link between interbank markets and systemic risk. Section 
3 examines important features of the Belgian interbank 
market that might have a bearing on contagion risk. 
Section 4 presents the results of the simulation exercise. 
Section 5 concludes.
2.  Interbank markets and systemic risk
2.1 Raison  d’être of interbank markets
The interbank market is part of the overall money market. The 
money market, in general, refers to the wholesale market for 
low-risk, highly liquid, short-term debt instruments (see e.g. 
Stigum, 1990). Banks trade liquidity, and therefore take on 
interbank exposures for two main reasons. (4)
First, banks need to pay out cash to customers on demand 
and to clear transfers of their customers’ deposits to other 
banks. Deviations of actual liquidity needs from banks’ 
expectations imply that banks may, ex-post, hold excess 
liquidity or need to obtain liquidity. (5) Interbank markets 
are then used for risk sharing purposes, i.e. to manage 
bank-idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Interbank markets 
thus allow ﬁ  nancial intermediaries to offer improved risk 
sharing services to their clients.
Second, interbank markets are a convenient instrument for 
managing liquidity while simultaneously optimising banks’ 
assets and liabilities management, by taking on exposures 
with the desired characteristics. Indeed, interbank markets 
may be used to hedge and transform other kinds of risks 
such as foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk.
2.2  Interbank markets and systemic risks
Contagion on interbank markets can occur in at least three 
types of situations : (i) when aggregate liquidity is insufﬁ  cient, 
(ii) when the collapse of a bank induces a domino effect and 
(iii) when market expectations create spill-over effects. We 
now examine these three situations in more detail.
In the aggregate, the interbank market only redistributes 
liquidity across banks; it does not create liquidity. A lack 
of aggregate liquidity could occur, for instance, if banks 
have excessive conﬁ   dence in the ability of interbank 
markets to absorb transitory liquidity shocks, so that 
they under-invest in liquid assets (Bhattacharya and Gale, 
1987). Interbank exposures may create problems if aggre-
gate liquidity provision is insufﬁ  cient. In this case, banks 
would try to avoid liquidation of their long-term assets, 
and would therefore liquidate their claims on other banks 
(possibly in other regions). A ﬁ  nancial crisis in one region 
could then spread by contagion to other regions and 
thereby introduce liquidity problems in the latter (Allen 
and Gale, 2000). It should, however, be noted that in 
practice central banks play a key role in preventing aggre-
gate liquidity shortages.
A second source of contagion is the domino effect itself. 
The failure of one individual bank may initiate a domino 
effect if the non-repayment of interbank obligations by 
the failing bank jeopardises the ability of its creditor banks 
to meet their obligations to their (interbank) creditors. 
Contagion occurs then “mechanically” through the direct 
interlinkages between banks.
“Spill-overs” through market expectations represent a 
third potential channel for contagion. For example, bank 
runs may occur when depositors observe other customers 
who face liquidity shocks withdrawing their funds from 
the bank. The depositors not facing liquidity shocks may 
decide to withdraw too, in the fear that they will ulti-
mately be unable to recover their deposits (especially if 
banks must begin liquidating illiquid long-term assets in 
order to meet the high liquidity demand). These beliefs 
then become self-fulﬁ  lling  (see  Diamond  and  Dybvig, 
1983). Other forms of market spill-over include withdraw-
als by depositors from (or unwillingness by other banks to 
provide liquidity to) a bank engaging in similar activities as 
those of a failing bank. Of course, regulatory intervention 
such as suspension of convertibility or deposit insurance 
may alleviate the problem of bank runs and banking 
panics (for an overview see Freixas and Rochet, 1997).
Factors that could inﬂ  uence the level of contagion 
risk include :
• The structure of interbank linkages  : Interbank market 
structures that are “complete”, where all banks have 
symmetric links with the other banks operating in 
the interbank market, appear to be less vulnerable to 
contagion than are “incomplete” market structures, 
where banks are only linked to some other banks of 
the system (Allen and Gale, 2000). Another possible 
(4)  It is, among other things, through the interbank market that central banks imple-
ment their monetary policy. Banks, in turn, are able to obtain liquidity from the 
central bank at a penalty interest rate, via the marginal lending facility.
(5)  Note that a bank can also have excess cash or liquidity needs ex-post, without 
deviation from its expectations, if it is ex ante specialised in deposit raising or in 
lending and deliberately relies on interbank markets to absorb its excess cash or to 
provide liquidity afterwards. 107
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form of interbank market structure is that of a “money 
centre,” where a bank at the centre is symmetrically 
linked to all the other banks without these banks being 
linked together. Freixas et al. (2000) analyse this type of 
structure and show that, in some cases, the failure of a 
bank linked to the money centre will not trigger the fail-
ure of the money centre, but the failure of the money 
centre itself may trigger failures of the linked banks.
• Market concentration  : Economic theory does not 
provide an unambiguous response to the question 
of the impact of increasing concentration in bank-
ing markets on the stability of interbank markets, 
although some authors do ﬁ  nd that such a trade-off 
exists in certain circumstances. (6) However,  concen-
tration increases the probability of “too-big-to-fail” 
type intervention in a crisis, which may induce exces-
sive ex ante risk-taking behaviour on the part of large 
banks and increase the risk of crisis. Moreover, in the 
absence of too-big-to-fail intervention, the severity 
of contagion may be reinforced by a high degree of 
concentration.
• Risk mitigation techniques  : Risk mitigation techniques, 
such as collateralised interbank loans (e.g. repos) reduce 
the risks of contagion. On the other hand, the existence 
of a repo market may lead to the disappearance of the 
uninsured international interbank market (Freixas and 
Holthausen, 2001). This can occur as a result of asym-
metric information; a bank that attempts to obtain 
an unsecured cross-border loan may be suspected of 
having had the loan denied by other domestic banks 
which have more information about the borrower.
• Netting mechanism  : The use of netting contracts among 
banks is a mechanism for reducing interbank exposures. 
A problem at one bank is then less likely to initiate a 
“domino effect” on the interbank market. Emmons 
(1995), however, shows that netting of interbank claims 
shifts the bank default risk away from interbank claimants 
towards non-bank creditors, i.e. the risk is transferred to 
the banks’ creditors who are not included in the netting 
agreement.
• Limits to large exposures  : Limits imposed by authorities 
on banks’ large exposures (see e.g., the 1992 EU Directive 
on the monitoring and control of large exposures of credit 
institutions) contribute to reducing contagion risk. Limits 
are usually formulated in terms of banks’ own funds. For 
example, the EU Directive states that a bank’s maximum 
exposure to a single counterparty may not exceed 25 p.c. 
of regulatory own funds, and the cumulative amount of 
individual exposures exceeding 10 p.c. of regulatory own 
funds may not exceed 800 p.c. of those own funds.
• Central bank intervention  : Potential central bank inter-
vention, as well as the presence of safety nets, lowers 
contagion risk. Central banks may decide to provide 
liquidity to the market as a whole when aggregate 
liquidity is insufﬁ   cient, or directly to individual banks 
when the market fails to provide liquidity to sound 
ﬁ   nancial institutions. Moreover, although interbank 
exposures are not explicitly covered by deposit insur-
ance, issues such as “too-big-to-fail” may introduce 
implicit deposit insurance for these exposures.
3.  Features of the Belgian interbank 
market
In the previous section we have highlighted the links 
between the structure of the interbank market and the 
risks of contagion. In this section we describe some 
important features of the Belgian interbank market, 
their evolution over time, and their potential impact on 
contagion. Two main features, which reﬂ  ect two different 
dimensions of contagion risk, are considered  : (i) the size 
of the market and (ii) the structure of interbank loans and 
deposits. The size of the market determines the maximal 
direct knock-on effect on the banking system of defaults 
on interbank loans. The structure of interbank loans and 
deposits, in particular their maturity and secured charac-
ter, also inﬂ  uences the nature of contagion risks.
3.1 Size
Although aggregate interbank exposures of Belgian 
banks have increased over time (interbank loans repre-
sented a gross exposure of € 176 billion at the end of 
2002 vs. € 92 billion at the end of 1992, while on the 
same dates interbank deposits amounted to € 228 billion 
vs. € 119 billion), their growth has paralleled that of total 
bank assets. Indeed, between Q4-1992 and Q4-2002, 
interbank loans grew at a compound annual rate of 
6.8 p.c., compared to 6.6 p.c. for total assets, and inter-
bank exposures now represent just a slightly higher frac-
tion of total assets than ten years ago. (7) Interbank loans 
of Belgian banks have consistently represented 20  to 
(6)  For an overview of these issues see e.g. Carletti and Hartmann (2002), Carletti et 
al (2002) examine the effects of bank mergers on reserve management and on 
interbank market liquidity. They argue that the probability of the banking system 
experiencing a liquidity shortage following a merger hinges on several factors, 
including the cost of reﬁ  nancing on the interbank market relative to the cost of 
raising deposits and the structure of the post-merger liquidity shocks to banks’. 
Allen and Gale (2003) show that contagion is less likely to occur in imperfect 
competition than in a perfectly competitive interbank market. Indeed, in imperfect 
competition, banks’ actions affect the price of liquidity, leading banks to adopt 
strategical behaviour that may reduce contagion.
(7)  Unless otherwise noted, the ﬁ  gures presented in this paper are reported on a com-
pany basis only. The interbank exposures represent interbank loans and deposits as 
reported in banks’ balance sheet data. They exclude assets, such as bank bonds, 
shares or off-balance-sheet instruments. The ﬁ  gures provide an estimate of the 
stock of interbank loans and deposits owned by Belgian banks at a particular point 
in time.108
30 p.c. of their assets over the last decade, while their 
deposits accounted for 28  to 40  p.c. of their liabilities. 
As Chart 1 illustrates, these ratios are broadly in line with 
the average at the EMU level (at the end of 2001, EMU 
interbank loans accounted for 22  p.c. of total assets), 
although there are signiﬁ  cant differences between coun-
tries such as Finland (3 p.c.) or Luxembourg (48 p.c.). (8)
Several factors have contributed to a recent reduction in 
the relative importance of interbank exposures of Belgian 
banks relative to their peak during the past decade. First, 
1999 was marked by the transition to a single currency in 
the whole euro area. This reduced the number of currencies 
traded by Belgian banks and subsequently the need to take 
positions in them. Secondly, the adoption of more effective 
large payment systems with real time gross settlement led 
to a drop in bilateral accounts between banks, as well as to 
less recourse to correspondent banking networks. Thirdly, 
the major consolidation wave in the Belgian banking sector 
in recent years has coincided with a decrease in the volume 
of domestic transactions, since interlinkages between 
merging banks were offset. Finally, actions by several large 
foreign banks to centralise their treasury management 
operations may also have contributed to reducing inter-
bank loans and deposits of their Belgian subsidiaries.
As can be inferred from Chart 1, interbank deposits and 
interbank loans evolve very similarly. However, the magni-
tude of their movements differs, so that the net position  (9) of 
the Belgian interbank market ﬂ  uctuates, although it always 
remains negative. At ﬁ  rst sight, this dependence vis-à-vis 
foreign countries may appear to be a source of vulnerabil-
ity. In reality, several alternative sources of liquidity could 
compensate for a potential outﬂ  ow of interbank liquidity. 
Central banks, for instance, may intervene to ensure the 
smooth redistribution of liquidity. The portfolios of Belgian 
banks also include a large proportion of government bonds, 
giving them quick access to liquidity. Moreover, the situa-
tion of Belgian banks is far from exceptional. According 
to OECD statistics, several European countries also have a 
structurally negative interbank net position. This negative 
net position is due not only to the structure of their bank-
ing systems but also to differences in the tax treatment of 
deposits across countries.  (10) Finally, it should be noted that 
the net position of the Belgian banking system has tended 
to become less negative over the last ﬁ  ve years.
(8)  According to the ECB (2002a), it is hard to ﬁ  nd uniformity in the nature and 
importance of interbank activities across institutions and across countries because 
of the different banking structures characterising each EMU member.
(9)  The interbank net position is deﬁ  ned as the difference between interbank loans 
(claims banks hold on other banks) and interbank deposits (claims other banks 
have on these banks). Hence, a negative net position implies that the interbank 
deposits are greater than the interbank loans.
(10) Huizinga  and  Nicodème (2001) ﬁ   nd that non-bank international deposits are 
positively related to wealth taxes and to the presence of domestic bank interest 
reporting. This suggests that non-bank international deposits are in part deter-
mined by tax concerns. With regard to international interbank deposits, the tax 
treatment of deposits also undoubtedly plays a role, although it is not the sole 
driver. Chevallier-Farat (1988) reports, for instance, that the creation of off-shore 
areas in the United States in 1981 (International Banking Facilities) triggered mas-
sive movements of international interbank funds. Moshirian and Bishop (1997) 
show that international interbank movement of funds were determined, among 
other things, by the relative cost of capital (which is affected by differences in tax 
treatments) between countries. One partial explanation for the negative net posi-
tion of the Belgian banking system could be the ﬁ  scal asymmetry between Belgium 
and its neighbouring countries, in particular Luxembourg. Due to the lenient tax 
treatment of savings in neighbouring countries, some neighbouring countries 
attract the savings of some Belgian households. This may explain why some banks 

































































































% Interbank loans % Interbank deposits Net position as a % of total assets
CHART 1  INTERBANK LOANS AND DEPOSITS OF BELGIAN AND EMU BANKS AS A P.C. OF TOTAL ASSETS
 (Weighted  average ; Belgian figures on a monthly basis ; EMU figures on an annual basis)
Sources : NBB, OECD.




Interbank loans and deposits show considerable hetero-
geneity in terms of their maturity, their secured charac-
ter, and the counterparties. Indeed, these interbank 
exposures comprise several components  : sight deposits, 
time loans  /  deposits, central bank accounts, monetary 
reserves and secured loans/deposits such as repurchase 
agreements (11) or collateralised lending (Table 1).
Secured  loans / deposits  and  term  loans / deposits  are  the 
most important categories of both interbank loans and 
deposits. Secured interbank loans of Belgian banks now 
account for about 50 p.c. of interbank loans and secured 
deposits for about 43 p.c. of interbank deposits, whereas 
at the beginning of the nineties, secured loans represented 
less than 10 p.c. of total interbank loans (Chart 2).
The recourse to secured loans and the use of repos have 
actually constituted a major change in the strategy of 
Belgian banks during the last decade. Initially, secured 
loans became more important for exposures between 
Belgian banks. Over the last ﬁ  ve years, however, secured 
loans have also caught up for exposures between Belgian 
banks and foreign banks. (12)  This shift towards secured 
loans is an important change that we will keep in mind 
in interpreting the results of our contagion exercise in 
Section 4. In particular, the increased reliance on secured 
loans has probably contributed to a considerably lower 
risk of contagion by decreasing expected losses in case of 
default, by both Belgian and foreign interbank borrowers. 
We may expect the use of secured loans to be further 
stimulated in the future by the EU directive on Financial 
Collateral. (13)
Another striking point revealed by Table 1 is the high level 
of internationalisation of the interbank market. Belgium 
is a particularly open economy, and so is its interbank 
market. A substantial share (more than 85 p.c.) of both 
interbank loans and deposits of Belgian banks is indeed 
cross-border. At the beginning of the nineties, this share 
already exceeded 70 p.c., and it has constantly increased 
since Q4-1998. These exceptionally high proportions of 
cross-border interbank loans and deposits highlight a 
feature of the Belgian interbank market which potentially 
transforms the risk of contagion, as well as the way it 
should be handled. Given that the lion’s share of the inter-
bank exposure is situated abroad, Belgian banks might 
be more sensitive to international crises than to domestic 
ones, and any attempt to assess the impact of interbank 
markets on Belgian ﬁ   nancial stability must be viewed 
in that perspective. A signiﬁ   cant step in this direction 
was taken with the agreement on the memorandum of 
(11) A repurchase agreement (repo) is an agreement between two parties whereby one 
party sells the other a security with a commitment to repurchase it at a pre-speci-
ﬁ  ed date and price. Most repos are overnight transactions, with the sale taking 
place on the ﬁ  rst day and being reversed the day after. A repo is considered as a 
loan since the party selling the security disposes of funds which have to be repaid 
afterwards. It is secured because the party that purchases the security holds it as 
collateral.
(12) The monetary policy reform in Belgium in 1991 fostered the use of repos between 
Belgian banks. Since the EU legislative framework on monetary policy was devel-
oped later, the use of collateral between EU banks also increased later.
(13) Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 
2002 on ﬁ  nancial collateral arrangements. See e.g. NBB (2002).
TABLE 1 STRUCTURE OF INTERBANK LOANS AND DEPOSITS OF BELGIAN BANKS
(December 2002, percentages)
Source: NBB.
Origin of counterparty Belgium EMU RoW Total
Interbank loans
Sight deposits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.6 1.1 2.1
Term loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 27.2 12.9 46.3
Secured loans   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 18.5 24.8 49.4
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 0.1 0.0 2.2
Total   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.7 46.4 38.9 100.0
Interbank deposits
Sight deposits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 1.3 1.3 2.8
Term deposits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 11.7 35.4 54.4
Secured deposits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 20.3 15.7 42.7
Total   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4 33.3 52.4 100.0110
understanding on high-level principles of co-operation in 
crisis management by EU countries, which aims at co-ordi-
nating interactions between supervisors and central banks 
at the EU level. (14)
Banks of the neighbouring countries (i.e. France, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and the UK) repre-
sent the most important interbank positions in the bal-
ance sheets of Belgian banks (Chart 3). This is not surpris-
ing since the UK, France and Germany all tend to operate 
as interbank centres. Moreover, the connections between 
Belgian banks and Luxembourg or the Netherlands are 
heavily inﬂ  uenced by the shareholder structures of large 
Belgian banks. Since Belgian banks have strong links with 
these countries, we will pay particular attention to them 
in our contagion exercise.
The maturity structure of interbank loans is also important 
for determining the consequences of potential contagion. 
Both interbank loans and deposits show a relatively short 
maturity (Table 2), and only 24.1 p.c. of interbank loans 
have a maturity exceeding 3 months. (15) It thus seems that 
Belgian banks use interbank markets mainly to manage 
their short-term liquidity needs.
The interbank market is highly concentrated, as suggested 
by Table 3, which provides data on interbank exposures 
of banks by bank size groupings. Several observations 
follow from this table. First, the value of interbank loans 


























































CHART 2   SECURED INTERBANK LOANS 
















CHART 3  INTERBANK POSITIONS OF BELGIAN BANKS VIS-À-VIS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
  (December 2002, percentages, data  on a territorial basis (1) ) 
Source : NBB. 
(1)  Sample composed of the same banks as in the other tables.
INTERBANK ASSETS INTERBANK DEPOSITS
UK BE NL FR DE LU Other EU countries
(14) See ECB Press Release, 10 March 2003.
(15) Data on the German interbank market (Upper and Worms, 2002) indicate that 
more than 75 p.c. of the interbank assets and liabilities have a maturity exceed-
ing 1 month and more than 50 p.c. of the interbank assets and liabilities have a 
maturity exceeding 4 years.111
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negative net interbank position of the Belgian banking 
sector is attributable almost exclusively to the negative 
positions of the four major banks (group G1). With the 
exception of group G3, all groups other than G1 have a 
positive net position.
A third observation suggested by Table 3 is that interbank 
activities with foreign banks are mainly concentrated in 
large Belgian banks. However, access to international inter-
bank markets does not seem to be limited strictly to large 
banks. In particular, Belgian subsidiaries of foreign banks 
often have important intra-bank positions. Nevertheless, 
the proportion of foreign interbank loans and deposits 
tends to decrease with bank size. This may be true for 
several reasons. For instance, smaller banks may not reach 
the critical size necessary to conclude transactions on the 
international interbank market. Smaller banks could also 
be less known internationally, which could effectively 
deny them access to the international interbank market. 
This would, in a sense, provide support for one of the sce-
narios presented by Freixas and Holthausen (2001), where 
large banks with a good international reputation act as 
correspondent banks for their domestic peers in order to 
overcome problems of asymmetric information.
3.3 Summary
Although the gross interbank exposures of Belgian banks 
have increased over time, interbank loans and deposits 
currently represent about the same percentage of total 
assets as ten years ago. Moreover, banks have increased 
their recourse to secured loans, and their interbank loans 
are mainly short term. The nature of contagion risk has 
likely been further affected by two trends  : the continu-
ing growth in the importance of cross-border interbank 
loans and increasing concentration of the Belgian banking 
market.
TABLE 2 RESIDUAL MATURITY OF INTERBANK LOANS AND DEPOSITS OF BELGIAN BANKS
(December 2002, percentages)
Source: NBB.
<= 8 days 8 days – 1 month 1-3 month 3-6 months 6 months – 1 year > 1 year Undetermined
Loans   . . . . . . . . . . . 28.0 22.6 25.3 11.5 8.4 2.9 1.3
Deposits   . . . . . . . . . 39.5 25.4 17.2 9.3 6.7 1.8 0.1
TABLE 3 INTERBANK EXPOSURES BY BANK SIZE CATEGORIES
(December 2002, billions of euros)
Source: NBB.




























in group total 
(Percentages)
G1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 85.1 151.1 70.6 64.0 89.1 207.5 71.4 111.7 88.2
G2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 18.3 9.4 3.0 67.6 13.2 3.9 4.9 66.8
G3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 4.5 1.3 1.4 60.6 5.9 0.6 2.5 52.7
G4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.9 0.4 0.3 36.3 1.6 0.0 0.6 38.6
G5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.0 30.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 176.5 81.9 68.7 228.6 75.9 119.7112
4.  Simulation analysis of systemic risk 
on the Belgian interbank market
Section  3 has described some important characteristics of 
the Belgian interbank market; however, the extent to which 
these characteristics affect contagion risk was not formally 
investigated. This section presents the results of a contagion 
exercise  (16)  – similar to the ones carried out by other central 
banks  (17) – whose objective is to quantify the effects of a 
sudden and unexpected failure by a banking counterparty of 
Belgian banks at a speciﬁ  ed point in time. As noted earlier, 
the approach is rather mechanical as it does not take into 
account the behaviour of the various players (banks, regula-
tors) or their (changes in) expectations. It therefore does not 
aim to depict the exact reactions of interbank players in a 
crisis. Rather, it is an exercise designed to analyse a stress situ-
ation created by interbank market linkages and, in the cases 
where contagion occurs, to investigate how it would spread 
and the amount of bank losses that would result.
The interbank exposure data used in the analysis are 
reported on a company basis only; i.e. they include the 
foreign branches of Belgian banks and Belgian subsidiaries 
of foreign banks, but they do not include foreign subsidiar-
ies of Belgian banks or Belgian branches of foreign banks. 
Unreported results show that the ﬁ  gures, when available, do 
not differ signiﬁ  cantly when based on other data (collected 
on a territorial or consolidated basis). Interbank exposures 
represent interbank loans and deposits as reported in banks’ 
balance sheet data. Other types of assets, such as bank 
bonds, shares or off-balance-sheet instruments, are not 
reported.
4.1  Overview of the methodology
In order to quantify contagion risk, we have successively 
simulated the consequences of default on interbank obli-
gations of each individual Belgian or foreign banking coun-
terparty. In the exercise (see Box 1 for details on the meth-
odology), we deﬁ  ne bank “failure” following default by an 
interbank borrower as a situation where the lender bank’s 
tier-I capital becomes negative as a result of the default. 
The extent to which the lender’s capital decreases follow-
ing the borrower’s default depends on both the exposure 
at default and the loss given default (LGD). As explained 
in the Box, the initial default of a bank on its interbank 
obligations may cause successive rounds of defaults. The 
contagion effect ends when banks that defaulted during 
the last round do not cause any new bank defaults.
This exercise requires information on bilateral interbank 
exposures of Belgian banks. We estimate these exposures via 
two methods. We ﬁ  rst use banks’ reported large interbank 
exposures (exceeding 10 p.c. of own funds, together with 
the name of the counterparty).  (18)  We then use a second 
source of information − the total amount of interbank loans 
and deposits reported by each individual bank. The simula-
tion technique with the latter source of information requires 
making an assumption regarding the distribution across 
other banks of each bank’s total exposures. Following other 
similar studies, we assume maximum dispersion of these 
exposures across banks (see Box 1 for details).
These two estimation techniques, and the general conta-
gion exercise, involve biases − some of which tend toward 
underestimation and others toward overestimation of con-
tagion risk. (19) The sources of bias are summarised below. 
The extent to which contagion risk will actually be under-
estimated or overestimated in our simulations will obviously 
depend upon the importance of each of these sources.
Factors causing underestimation of contagion risk :
• Measure of interbank exposures, which includes inter-
bank loans and deposits only and does not include 
other interbank exposures, such as off-balance-sheet 
exposures.
• Distributional assumption of maximum dispersion of 
banks’ interbank exposures (see Box 1).
• Indirect effects of the failure of foreign banks are not 
taken into account, since we are not able to measure 
contagion between foreign banks. (20)
• Credit risk is the only source of interbank contagion; 
liquidity risks (21) are ignored.
• Conservative deﬁ  nition of bank failure  : banks may fail 
before their tier-I capital is exhausted.
(16) The full contagion exercise, as well as the methodology used and its shortcomings, 
is presented in detail in Degryse and Nguyen (2003).
(17) See e.g. Upper and Worms (2002) or Wells (2002).
(18) The extent to which the large interbank exposures cover a bank’s total interbank 
exposures varies from one bank to another. The large exposures reported by the 
ﬁ  ve largest Belgian banks’ covered on average about 70% of their total interbank 
exposures as reported in their balance sheets. The non-reported exposures prob-
ably represent a smaller risk in terms of contagion.
(19) A bias against contagion minimises Type II errors, i.e. incorrectly accepting a false 
hypothesis. This implies a trade-off in terms of Type I errors, i.e. incorrectly rejecting 
a true hypothesis. In other words, in the presence of a bias against contagion, we 
might be able to state that there is a potential for contagion. On the other hand, 
we would not be able to say that contagion is non-existent.
(20) When we measure the impact on Belgian banks of the failure of a foreign bank, we 
disregard the “foreign second and further round effects”. However, the failure of a 
foreign bank is likely to have an impact on its domestic market, and some foreign 
banks (possibly counterparties of Belgian banks) may default subsequent to the ﬁ  rst 
failure, worsening the overall situation of Belgian banks. We undertake a type of 
sensitivity analysis in Section 4.2.2 to try to compensate for this limitation.
(21)  Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank experiences a liquidity shortfall because its 
counterparty fails to meet its obligations. For instance, a bank may face a liquidity 
shortfall because its counterparty postpones a repayment or because it takes time 
to realise collateral.113
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• Bank panics by depositors assumed not to occur. (22)
Factors causing overestimation of contagion risk :
• Banks assumed not to be able to reﬁ  nance or to raise 
additional capital.
• Banks assumed not to anticipate crises and reduce their 
interbank exposures.
• Safety nets assumed absent.
• Measure of interbank exposures is on a company basis 
and not on a consolidated basis. (23)
The fact that the contagion exercises are mechanical and 
potentially involve biases suggests that the results reported 
below should be interpreted in much the same spirit as 
those of a stress test. Yet, despite the caution that must be 
exercised in interpreting the results, this type of exercise rep-
resents one of the only means of obtaining any quantitative 
assessment of interbank contagion risk. This type of exercise 
has also been undertaken by other central banks and thus 
allows for some international comparisons. The results may 
provide general indications regarding the relative importance 
of different sources of interbank contagion.
(22) Bank panics may occur following an individual bank’s failure if depositors make 
inferences about systemic weakness based on observation of the individual failure 
(see Aghion et al., 2000).
(23) Interbank exposure data were not available on a consolidated basis. Although the 
use of data at a company level leads to the implicit assumption that cross-border 
intra-group exposures are between different banks, our actual simulations reveal 
few cases where such exposures cause “contagion”.
Methodology of the contagion exercise
The methodology applied in this paper is based on Upper and Worms (2002), and aims at assessing the impact on 
the Belgian ﬁ  nancial system of the sudden and unexpected failure of each banking counterpart of Belgian banks. 
The contagion test uses the matrix of interbank bilateral exposures, X, to study the crisis propagation mechanisms. 
The matrix X of bilateral exposures summarises the interbank exposures of Belgian banks towards the other (N-1) 
Belgian banks and the M foreign banks :
  
  
where   represents the gross exposure of bank  to the Belgian bank j,   represents the gross exposure of bank 
 to the foreign bank j,   represents the Belgian interbank assets of bank ,   represents the Belgian interbank 
liabilities of bank j and f  represents the foreign interbank assets of bank .
The simulations successively study the impact of the failure of one of the N Belgian banks or one of the M foreign 
banks for a given LGD. The initial failure causes an additional failure when the exposure of one bank to failed 
banks is large enough to offset its tier-I capital. More speciﬁ  cally, the bank  fails following other failures when
  
for all banks j that failed
Box 1114
where   refers to the tier-I capital of bank  and   refers to the LGD. The LGD is assumed to be constant 
and identical for all the failed banks. We use the gross exposures   and   instead of the netted ones 
(  –  ), since in case of bankruptcy, netting would appear to be unlikely to occur. The initial default may cause 
several rounds of failures when the combined effects of the failed banks trigger new failures at each round. The 
contagion effect ends when banks that failed during the last round of failures do not cause any additional failures, 
i.e. when the system is again stable.
The matrix of bilateral exposures is unknown. Similarly to Wells (2002), we use two alternative assumptions to 
solve this problem. The ﬁ  rst one consists of using a matrix of bilateral exposures based on large exposures only. 
The second one entails using the information contained in each bank’s total exposures to Belgian banks   and   
and making an assumption on how they are distributed in the matrix.
Banks report their exposures (including their interbank exposures) exceeding 10 p.c. of their own funds. This source 
of information allows us to ﬁ  ll in several cells in the matrix of bilateral exposures but does not provide the full matrix 
since it omits smaller exposures, which are probably less signiﬁ  cant in terms of contagion risk. These data do not 
require any additional assumption on the distribution of exposures and they include exposures to foreign banks.
The second technique, which is commonly used in computing input-output tables and frequently used in conta-
gion exercises, is based on the observed   and   which only provide incomplete information on interbank expo-
sures, i.e. the column and row sums of the matrix X, or the marginal distribution of the  . Since the information 
is partial, we need to make an assumption on the distribution of the individual interbank exposures. We assume 
that banks seek to maximise the dispersion of their interbank activities. With the appropriate standardisation, this 
would be equivalent to assuming that X = XO such that   =  . However, such a distribution would neglect an 
important feature of the interbank market which is that banks do not have interbank exposures to themselves, so 
we have to add the constraint that   = O for each   where  = j. The constrained matrix of bilateral exposures 
should stay as close as possible to XO. Technically, this is equivalent to minimising the distance function (measured 





This kind of problem is easily solved with the RAS algorithm  (1). This approach, however, allows us to construct a 
matrix of bilateral exposures between Belgian banks only, so, when we use the second technique, we unfortunately 
do not have any information on foreign banks.
(1)  See e.g. Blien and Graef (1997).




4.2.1 Contagion triggered by the default of a Belgian 
bank
Table 4  reports results of our contagion exercise under 
the assumption that the initial interbank defaulter 
(the so-called “ﬁ  rst  domino”) is a Belgian bank. In 
December  2002, there were 65  banks incorporated in 
Belgium, i.e. 65  potential sources of contagion. The 
ﬁ   rst panel of the table presents results where bilateral 
exposures were estimated on the basis of the large expo-
sure data, and the second panel on the total interbank 
exposure data (maximum entropy distribution). As Table 
4  shows, the frequency of contagion occurring in the 
simulations is limited. Under the extreme assumption of 
100 p.c. loss given default (LGD), no more than 12 unex-
pected Belgian bank failures cause the failure of at least 
one other Belgian bank. The knock-on effects are also lim-
ited. Indeed, in a worst-case scenario (24), banks that would 
lose their tier-I capital as a result of the interbank defaults 
in the simulations would never represent more than 
3.8 p.c. of the total assets of Belgian banks. (25) Thus, the 
default of a Belgian bank in the interbank market cannot, 
in the context of this exercise, cause a large Belgian bank 
to lose all of its tier-I capital. Moreover, if we assume an 
LGD of 40 p.c., which would probably be more realistic 
given that secured loans account for more than 50 p.c. 
of total interbank loans (26), the losses are lower. Finally, in 
the median scenarios (27), the percentages of assets repre-
sented by banks losing their tier-I capital are considerably 
lower than in the worst-case scenarios.
Interestingly, contagion between Belgian banks does not 
appear to have always been this low.
(24) The worst-case scenario is the scenario for which the percentage of total banking 
assets represented by  banks losing their entire tier-I capital is greatest.
(25) This ﬁ  gure comes from the entropy maximisation simulations. The ﬁ  gure decreases 
to 3 p.c. for the simulations using large exposure data.
(26) The statistical estimation of an LGD for Belgian banks is very difﬁ  cult, since for-
tunately very few Belgian banks have failed in the last decades. Moreover, actual 
losses on a defaulting bank can prove very complicated to calculate, since they 
depend on the time horizon chosen. Altman and Kishore (1996) estimate average 
recovery rates on defaulting bonds of ﬁ  nancial institutions (for the period 1978-
1995) to be about 36 p.c.  However, recovery rates vary by type of institution: 
mortgage banks, 68 p.c.; ﬁ  nance companies, 46 p.c.; ﬁ  nancial services, 42 p.c.; 
commercial banks, 29 p.c.; savings institutions, 9 p.c.. However, the LGD for bonds 
is probably very different from the LGD for comparable loans (which in our case 
comprise secured and unsecured assets). James (1991) estimates that losses aver-
age 30 p.c. of the failed bank’s assets and that the direct expenses associated with 
bank closures average 10 p.c. of assets, making a total of about 40 p.c.. Seeing 
that more than 50 p.c. of interbank loans granted by Belgian banks are secured, 
it may therefore be realistic to assume a recovery rate of somewhere between 60 
and 80 p.c. (i.e. an LGD between 40 and 20 p.c.).
(27)  The median scenario gives the median value, across all of the scenarios where 
contagion occurs, of the percentage of total banking assets represented by banks 
losing their tier-I capital.




Number of scenarios 
where contagion occurs 
(out of 65 possible scenarios)
Maximum number of failed banks 
in a scenario, 
(including “first domino”)
Median scenario 





Percentages of balance sheet 
assets affected 
(excluding assets 
of “first domino”) 
Large Exposures at Q4 – 2002
100  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 12 0.46 2.97
80  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11 0.44 2.27
60  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8 0.16 1.77
40  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6 0.14 1.77
20  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 0.03 0.14
Maximum entropy distribution at Q4 – 2002
100  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 18 3.33 3.79
80  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 17 2.13 3.75
60  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 13 1.73 3.33
40  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 11 2.98 3.04
20  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 0.50 0.50116
Our contagion exercises conducted on historical data 
(using the maximum entropy distribution) show that, 
over the last decade, the worst-case scenarios in the 
case of contagion triggered by a Belgian bank have been 
subject to three major changes (Chart 4). Between 1992 
and 1997, the worst-case scenario consistently wors-
ened. Between 1997 and 1999, the worst-case scenario 
improved; i.e., the curve in Chart 4 decreased each year. 
Finally, since 1999 the curve has ﬂ  attened.  Thus,  the 
amount of contagion generated in simulations with cur-
rent data appears to be at a record low. (28) These trends 
are particularly striking for an LGD of 40 p.c. In this case, 
the percentage of total banking assets affected by con-
tagion, excluding the ﬁ  rst domino, varies over the time 
period from 61 p.c. to 3 p.c..
Several changes in the banking landscape could explain the 
results of these historical simulations. Between 1992 and 
1997, the share of interbank assets in total assets tended 
to increase. This ampliﬁ  ed the exposure of Belgian banks 
to other Belgian banks and increased the potential con-
sequences of contagion in the worst-case scenario. Since 
1997, mergers may have had an impact on the worst-case 
scenario. Large banks now seem to show an increased 
tendency to operate as money centres, where the failure 
of a bank linked to the money centre does not trigger 
the failure of the money centre itself. The decrease over 
time in medium-sized players, which were large enough 
to cause other banks to “fail” in the contagion exercise, 
also dampened the contagion effect observed over time in 
the simulations. Moreover, following consolidation, large 
banks have further increased their cross-border interbank 
exposures. (29) The bilateral interbank exposures between 
the large Belgian banks are now such that they no longer 
cause contagion in the simulations, although the failure 
of a large bank does still trigger the failure of small banks 
in the simulations.
This decrease in contagion over time for the domestic 
market simulations is potentially reassuring, although as 
noted earlier, these simulations may under- or overes-
timate the actual risk of contagion. Interbank loans to 
Belgian counterparts, however, constitute only a small 
portion of Belgian banks’ interbank loans, and a decrease 
in domestic contagion risk could have been accompanied 
by an increased sensitivity of Belgian banks to the inter-
national interbank market. This suggests the need for an 




























































































































































































































CHART 4  CONTAGION EFFECT : WORST-CASE SCENARIO
  (1993-2002)
Source : NBB.
(28) Unreported tests show that the trends observed are not sensitive to the quarter 
chosen although in some rare cases and for some speciﬁ  c LGDs, the percentage of 
balance sheet assets affected by contagion might diverge from the general trend.
(29) Although the share of international interbank loans has always been high for large 
banks, it has increased over the last decade. In December 1992, the interbank 
loans granted by large Belgian banks to foreign banks accounted for 79 p.c. of 
total interbank loans. This proportion reached 89 p.c. at the end of 2002.117
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4.2.2  Contagion triggered by the default of a foreign bank
About 85  p.c. of Belgian interbank loans are granted to 
foreign banks. Foreign interbank positions thus represent a 
potential source of contagion that may be more important 
than domestic contagion risk. We therefore extend the con-
tagion exercise to the foreign interbank market. Absence 
of data on the total interbank exposures of foreign banks, 
however, prevents us from using the maximum entropy 
technique for our simulations. The simulations are therefore 
limited to use of Belgian banks’ large exposure data.
Table 5 reports the results of the contagion simulations when 
a foreign bank is the ﬁ  rst defaulter (the “ﬁ  rst domino”) and 
when large exposure data are used. This table shows that 
given a 100% LGD the default of one large foreign bank 
can lead to the failure of 8 Belgian banks. In the worst-case 
scenario, the assets represented by Belgian banks losing their 
tier-I capital account for 20 p.c. of total Belgian bank assets. 
This result is considerably higher than the comparable ﬁ  gures 
for contagion simulations with Belgian banks as ﬁ  rst domi-
nos. Table 5 also indicates that even for an assumed LGD of 
40 p.c., the default of a foreign bank can, in the worst-case 
scenario, have a signiﬁ  cant impact on Belgian banks. Note 
that a small number of scenarios represented in Table 5 are 
due to cross-border intra-group positions; however, these 
scenarios represent exceptions rather than the rule.
Interestingly, contagion occurs less frequently (in less 
than 10 p.c. of cases) in the foreign-bank failure simula-
tions than in the simulations where the ﬁ  rst domino is a 
domestic bank. At most 13 of the 135 foreign counter-
parties listed by Belgian banks (in their reporting of large 
exposures) trigger contagion in the exercise. However, as 
the above discussion suggests, when cases of simulated 
contagion by foreign bank failure occur, they can affect 
a larger proportion of Belgian banking assets. Note, how-
ever, that large differences exist between the median and 
the worst-case scenarios. For an LGD of 100 p.c., only 
3 of the 13 simulations that involved contagion entailed 
the failure of banks representing at least 10 p.c. of the 
total assets of the Belgian banking system. In addition, 
all of the foreign banks representing the ﬁ  rst  domino 
in the worst-case scenarios are European banks and all 
are ranked as investment grade, which suggests that 
actual interbank defaults by these banks are unlikely. 
Unfortunately, the absence of a long time series of bank 
large-exposure data prevents us from studying changes in 
the international risk of contagion over time.
As noted above, this contagion analysis cannot incor-
porate indirect effects of the failure of foreign banks 
(i.e., failure of other foreign banks as a consequence of 
failure of a given foreign bank). One way to roughly take 
account of indirect effects is to use data on exposures of 
TABLE 5 CONTAGION EXERCISE: FOREIGN BANK AS INITIAL DEFAULTER




Number of scenarios 




of failed Belgian banks 
in a scenario
Median scenario 
Percentages of Belgian 
banks’ balance sheet assets 
affected
Worst-case scenario 
Percentages of Belgian 
banks’ balance sheet assets 
affected
Long Term Fitch 
credit rating of the first 
foreign bank to fail 
in the worst case scenario
(“first domino”)
100  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8 0.1 20.0 AA–
80  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8 0.0 20.0 AA+
60  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6 0.0 18.2 AA+
40  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 0.1 18.1 AA+
20  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 0.1 0.1 A
TABLE 6 SENSITIVITY OF BELGIAN BANKS TO LOSSES 
ON THEIR INTERBANK EXPOSURES 
TO FRANCE, THE UK, AND THE NETHERLANDS
(December 2002; assets of failed Belgian banks as a p.c. 
of total assets of Belgian banks; calculations based on data 
on a territorial basis)
Source: NBB.
Percentage default 
of country’s interbank 
exposures
France UK Netherlands
100  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.2 93.6 41.8
80  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.2 41.5 40.6
60  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.8 39.8 40.1
40  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 39.7 0.5
20  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.5118
Belgian banks to entire countries, instead of exposures to 
individual counterparts. Table 6 presents results of simula-
tions where we assume that x p.c. of the interbank loans 
granted by Belgian banks to banks in a particular country 
are unrecoverable. The table reports only those simula-
tions for which the total assets of failed Belgian banks 
resulting from the cross-border defaults exceeds 1 p.c. of 
total Belgian bank assets. For instance, in this exercise, if 
Belgian banks suddenly become unable to recover 80 p.c. 
of their interbank loans to French banks, Belgian banks 
representing 22 p.c. of the total assets of Belgian banks 
would incur losses (directly or indirectly) exceeding their 
tier-I capital. It is perhaps surprising to observe that apart 
from France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
simulations involving defaults on other countries’ inter-
bank loans (including Germany and Luxembourg) do 
not result in signiﬁ  cant contagion in the Belgian bank-
ing sector. For instance, if we were to simulate the 
consequences of Belgian banks losing 100 p.c. of their 
exposures to German banks, the Belgian banks losing all 
of their tier-I capital as a result would represent less than 
1 p.c. of total Belgian bank assets. Moreover, when we 
use more realistic loss rates, only the UK simulations yield 
signiﬁ   cant levels of contagion in Belgium. This in fact 
reﬂ  ects Britain’s role as a money centre and the impor-
tance of British banks in the Belgian interbank market.
The results of this section suggest that, in the Belgian con-
text, the international risk of contagion may deserve more 
attention than domestic contagion risk.
4.2.3 International  comparison
Our study is closely related to other empirical work on 
estimating contagion through interbank linkages. (30) 
Sheldon and Maurer (1998) study the issue of systemic 
risk in the Swiss interbank market. They conclude that 
the number of potential cases of contagion arising from 
interbank linkages in Switzerland is quite low. However, 
the failure of a large Swiss bank would have serious 
implications, affecting almost all average-size banks. 
Furﬁ  ne (1999), using data on bilateral exposures stem-
ming from overnight U.S. federal funds transactions, 
ﬁ  nds that multiple rounds of failures are unlikely, and 
that aggregate assets at failing banks never exceed 1% 
of total assets of the commercial banks. The results of 
Upper and Worms (2002) for the German interbank 
market suggest, however, that the contagion risk is not 
always conﬁ   ned to a limited number of small banks. 
Indeed, they conclude that a bank failure can trigger 
contagion in a sizeable part of the German banking 
system, although safety nets considerably reduce this 
risk. Wells (2002) ﬁ  nds that contagion would only occur 
following the failure of some large UK banks, which 
generally have a high credit rating. Finally, Elsinger et 
al. (2002), using a model that considers both credit risks 
and market risks and that endogenously determines 
the interbank ﬂ  ows, distinguish between fundamental 
(directly caused by a shock) and contagious insolvency. 
Their simulations indicate that in Austria, 97  p.c. of 
insolvencies may be classiﬁ  ed as fundamental whereas 
only the remaining 3 p.c. are due to contagion.
Our results have suggested that interbank contagion risk 
in Belgium has evolved over time. Any attempt to compare 
our results with the results of simulations for other countries 
must therefore take this time dimension into consideration. 
Table 7 compares our results with other studies using the 
same methodology. It indicates that the simulated failure 
of a Belgian bank in December  1998 produced weaker 
contagion effects than the failure of a German bank in the 
same period, at least for high LGDs. Indeed, the worst-case 
scenario curves are higher for the German banking system 
than for the Belgian system except for the case of an LGD 
of 40 p.c.. When we compare our results with those of 
Wells (2002) for the UK, which uses data for end 2000, 
we ﬁ  nd that the Belgian simulations produced a greater 
impact of contagion than for the UK. However, contagion 
occurred in a higher proportion of cases in the UK.
4.2.4 Institutional arrangements decreasing the risk of 
contagion
In recent months there have been several institutional 
initiatives aimed at decreasing the risk of (cross-border) 
ﬁ  nancial contagion. We brieﬂ  y mention two of them here : 
the Financial Collateral Directive and the Memorandum of 
Understanding on high-level principles of co-operation in 
crisis management.
The use of cross-border ﬁ  nancial collateral in the European 
Union has been facilitated by the Financial Collateral 
Directive adopted by the European Parliament in 2002. 
This directive aims at encouraging the cross-border use 
of ﬁ  nancial collateral, mainly by eliminating legal uncer-
tainty concerning the use of collateral and by providing 
a uniform regime for banks with regard to the taking of 
ﬁ  nancial collateral. This could further stimulate the cross-
border integration of interbank markets. (31)
Banking supervisory authorities and the central banks 
of the European Union have recently agreed on a 
Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles 
(30) As previously mentioned, contagion can propagate through other channels. Spill-
overs through market expectations could for instance have increased for large 
banks, as shown by their increasing interdependencies as measured by their stock 
return correlations, see for instance De Nicolo and Kwast (2001).
(31) See NBB (2002).119
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of co-operation in crisis management situations. This 
MoU entered into effect on March 1, 2003. (32) With the 
adoption of this memorandum, the authorities have 
expressed their commitment to co-operate to ensure the 
stability of the ﬁ  nancial system at the EU level. This agree-
ment enhances the practical arrangements for handling 
banking crises in order to facilitate an early assessment of 
the systemic risk of a crisis.
TABLE 7 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
Sources: Upper and Worms (2002), Wells (2002), NBB.
(1) Out of 80 cases.
(2) Because the median is calculated on the basis of a very few scenarios, it can decrease when the LGD increases.
(3) Out of 3,246 banks.
(4) Average instead of median – not conditional on multiple failure.
(5) Out of 72 cases.
(6) Out of 33 cases.
LGD
(Percentages)
Case of multiple failures triggered 
by a domestic bank
Maximum number of failed banks 
in a scenario, 
(including “first domino”)
Median scenario 
Percentages of balance sheet 
assets affected (excluding assets of 
“first domino”)
Worst-case scenario 
Percentages of balance sheet 
assets affected (excluding assets of 
“first domino”)
Maximum entropy distribution – Belgium December 1998 (1)
75  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 34 0.50 56.00
50  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 21 14.49 (2) 28.46
40  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 16 7.69 14.87
25  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 0.50 0.50
10  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 01 – 0.00
Upper and Worms (Germany) end December 1998 (3)
75  . . . . . . . . . . . . . n.a. 2,444 0.85 (4) 76.30
50  . . . . . . . . . . . . . n.a. 1,740 0.66 (4) 61.60
40  . . . . . . . . . . . . . n.a. 115 0.58 (4) 5.00
25  . . . . . . . . . . . . . n.a. 31 0.30 (4) 0.75
10  . . . . . . . . . . . . . n.a. 19 0.26 (4) 0.57
Maximum entropy distribution – Belgium December 2000 (5)
100  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 36 3.16 61.92
80  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 21 3.10 13.86
60  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 16 0.43 11.64
40  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 0.40 0.43
20  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 0.39 0.39
Wells (United Kingdom) end 2000 (6)
100  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 n.a. 8.80 25.20
80  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 n.a. 1.00 6.70
60  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 n.a. 0.00 6.70
40  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 n.a. 0.00 0.00
20  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 n.a. 0.00 0.00
(32) See ECB Press Release, 10 March 2003.
5. Concluding  remarks
In this paper we have undertaken an empirical exercise 
to investigate the risk of contagion due to interbank 
exposures of Belgian banks. We have used existing 
information on the total amounts of interbank expo-
sures of Belgian banks as well as banks’ reported large 
interbank exposures.
Before summarising our main ﬁ  ndings, we point again 
to the mechanical nature of our methodology. In our 
simulations, we start from data on interbank exposures 
and track the consequences of non-repayment of 120
(a fraction of) interbank loans on the equity capital 
of other banks, including any further domino-effects. 
This methodology does not allow for incorporating 
the role of market expectations or potential preventive 
measures taken by regulators and individual banks. 
Nevertheless, the exercise provides some insights 
regarding the potential impact of “stress” situations on 
the ﬁ  nancial system.
Our simulations suggest that the risk of contagion due to 
domestic interbank defaults has decreased over the past 
decade. However, interbank exposures between Belgian 
banks currently represent only 15  p.c. of total Belgian 
interbank exposures, suggesting that the potential con-
tagion risk stemming from foreign interbank exposures is 
more important. Our simulations indeed suggest that the 
failure of some foreign banks could have a sizeable effect 
on Belgian banks’ assets.
The threat of contagion originating from foreign inter-
bank borrowers, however, is mitigated by two main 
factors. First, our simulations indicate that cross-border 
interbank defaults have a major effect on the Belgian 
ﬁ  nancial system only for high values of loss given default 
(LGD). Belgian banks currently maintain relatively high 
proportions of secured interbank exposures, which tend 
to lower LGDs. Second, the foreign banks whose inter-
bank defaults had signiﬁ  cant effects in our simulations 
are all internationally recognised and have high invest-
ment grade ratings.
The current structure and characteristics of the Belgian 
interbank market reﬂ  ect several changes that have taken 
place over the past decade. Integration of money markets 
at the European level, increased recourse by banks to 
secured interbank exposures and several major mergers 
between Belgian banks have resulted in a trend towards 
market tiering and appear to have reshaped the risk of 
contagion. In the coming years changes in the microstruc-
ture of interbank markets may further alter the structure 
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